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PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND LABELLING
DANIEL J. GIFFORD*

The

Robinson-Patman Act applies primarily to the sales of goods
"of like grade and quality."' To determine the scope of the Act's

* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University of New
York at Buffalo; A.B., Holy Cross College, 1953; LL.B., Harvard University, 1958.
This article is a revised version of a portion of a dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law from
the Faculty of Law, Columbia University.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970). This article is concerned exclusively with sections
2(a) and 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Amendments to the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C.
§§ 13(a),(b) (1970)). Section 2(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between
different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or
any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where
such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular
possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States, and where
the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall prevent differentials which make
only due allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery
resulting from the differing methods or quantities in which such commodities
are to such purchasers sold or delivered: Provided, however, That the Federal
Trade Commission may, after due investigation and hearing to all interested
parties, fix and establish quantity limits, and revise the same as it finds necessary, as to particular commodities or classes of commodities, where it finds
that available purchasers in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly
in any line of commerce; and the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit differentials based on differences in quantities greater than those so fixed
and established: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in
restraint of trade: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall
prevent price changes from time to time where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned,
such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable
goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under court process, or
sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned.
Id. § 13 (a) (emphasis in original). Section 2 (b) provides:
Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section,
that there has been discrimination in price or services or facilities furnished,
the burden of rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this section, and
unless justification shall be affirmatively shown, the Commission is authorized
to issue an order terminating the discrimination: Provided, however, That
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-fade case
thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or
facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor.
Id. § 13(b) (emphasis in original).
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applicability to sales by a seller of brand-name goods at one price and
sales by him of unbranded or "private label" goods at a different price,
it is crucial to understand the extent to which different brand names
will be seen as creating differences in the grade or quality of the
goods to which they are attached. 2
The label-differentiation question arises in both primary- and
secondary-line cases. 3 In each class of cases a focus of attention has
been upon the "worth" of the label. 4 The prevalent view is that discrimination which does not exceed the label's worth is lawful because
it does not adversely affect competition. 5 A competing viewpoint urges
that when the worth of the label becomes sufficiently great, the labelled
product acquires a "grade and quality" different from that of the unlabelled product. 6 Although both approaches focus upon the "worth"
of the labelled product, it is a thesis of this article that the "worth" of
the label should not generally be of major significance in either the
primary- or secondary-line cases.
Early in the life of the Robinson-Patman Act, the Federal Trade
Commission took the position that physically similar goods were "of
like grade and quality," despite differences in the brand names under
which they were sold.7 The earlier Commission decisions, however,
did not openly confront the question of how brand differences were
related to the quoted statutory phrase. Thus, in Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., a primary-line case" decided by the Commission under the
2.

The discussion uses the terms "branded" and "labelled" interchangeably. In

the usage employed in the text, products which are referred to as "branded" or

"labelled" are those sold under brands or labels which carry significant economic values.
Products which are referred to as "unbranded" or "unlabelled" are not necessarily
sold without any identifying brand or label. Rather, they include so-called private-label
products and those sold under other brands or labels which carry no significant economic
value.
3. Actual or potential injury to competition in a market in which a discriminating
seller sells is generally referred to as primary-line injury, while actual or potential injury to competition in a market in which the discriminating seller's customers sell is
generally referred to as secondary-line injury.
4. See Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 180, 181 (5th Cir. 1967); REPORT OF
THE ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

NATIONAL

COMMITTEE TO

STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS:

158-59 (1955).
5.

Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 181 (5th Cir. 1967); REPORT OF THE
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 159

ATTORNEY

(1955).
6. See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 647, 651 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133, 137-38 (5th Cir. 1964); REPORT OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 158
(1955).
7. E.g., United States Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1500, 1501 (1939); cf.
Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C. 303, 309 (1938) (uncontested).
8. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936).
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old section 29 at the time Congress was debating the Robinson-Patman
legislation, the Goodyear Company conceded that the private-label
tires which it sold to Sears, Roebuck &cCo., were "comparable in
quality" to its own Goodyear-label tires which it sold at higher prices
to its own dealers.10 In other cases under the amended section 2 where
the Commission found unlawful discrimination, effected by lower prices
on private-label goods than were offered on goods bearing the seller's
regular label, the Commission merely asserted, in the conclusory
language of the statute, that the differently labelled goods were "of like
grade and quality," but offered no rationale for its finding."
The Commission's position has support in the legislative history
of the Robinson-Patman Act which contains reference to, and approval
of, the Commission's Goodyear decision.2 The Commission's position
is further supported by the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's
Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, which expressed the concern
that the Act's price-discrimination prohibitions not be evaded by a
mere difference in the labels which a seller attached to his wares.'3
There appears to be general agreement among the Commission and its
critics that the Act should not be read so that a mere difference in
labels would legitimize price discrimination which the Act would otherwise forbid. This general agreement necessarily encompasses treating
as "of like grade and quality" physically identical goods sold by a single
seller under different labels, so long as such labels do not carry any
significant economic value.
The major dispute over the last 20 years has been over the proper
treatment of a product which bears a label having measurable economic
value in the sense that the demand for the labelled good is significantly
higher than the demand for the same good without that label. A
minority of the Attorney General's Committee argued in 195514 that
recognition of this economic or commercial value required that a good
with an economically valuable label be treated as of a different grade
or quality than a good without it. In assessing similarities or differences in the grade or quality of goods, differences in consumers'
9.

(1970).

Clayton Act § 2, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 13

10. 22 F.T.C. at 290.
11. United States Rubber Co., 46 F.T.C. 998, 1006, 1007 (1950); United States
Rubber Co., 28 F.T.C. 1489, 1500, 1501 (1939); cf. Hansen Inoculator Co., 26 F.T.C.
303, 309 (1938) (uncontested).
12. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
13. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMaMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITUST LAWS 159 (1955).
14. Id. at 158.
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acceptance of the goods were considered to be as important as physical differences.
The Attorney General's Committee. The majority of the Committee did not deny the economic reality of product differentiation,
including preferences caused by heavy advertising, but it objected to
recognizing this differentiation in construing the "like grade and
quality" phrase of section 2 (a). Rather, the majority preferred to find
advertised, and unadvertised goods to be of like grade and quality
while recognizing the economic appeal of an advertised brand in applying the anticompetitive tendencies and cost-justification provisions of
the Act. 15
The majority members justified their position on several grounds.
First, they asserted that a marketing comparison of intrinsically identical goods in' applying the "like grade and quality" provisions might
"enmesh the administrators of the statute in complex economic investigations for every price discrimination charge."'16 The force of this
objection, however, depends upon the extent to which physical identity
would be taken, under the approach to which the majority objected,
as establishing a presumption of "like grade and quality," with the
respondent bearing the burden of establishing a marketing difference.
Adopting the latter approach would tend to involve the administrators
in complex economic investigations to no greater degree than utilizing physical identity as the test of like "grade and quality," while permitting a defense of no tendency to lessen competition-based on
marketing differences-with the burden of proof on the respondent.
If, however, the Commission must demonstrate a tendency to lessen
competition, then the exact significance of basing a marketing-differences defense on the tendency-to-lessen-competition criterion rather
than on the "like grade and quality" provision, is unclear. Second, the
majority thought that the preservation of physical identity as the test
of "like grade and quality" prevented evasion of the Act by "artificial
17
variations in the packaging, advertising or design" of the goods sold.
However, this reasoning is specious. The majority and minority agreed
that labels carrying no significant economic value should not legitimize
otherwise illegal price discrimination as this would be placing form
over substance. In the minority's view, it was exactly the "substance"
of the marketplace which ought to be preserved from subservience to
the physical "form" of the product. The minority urged that only
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 158-59.
Id. at 158.
Id.
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those labels which possessed a demonstrable economic value, in the
sense that the labelled product possessed a significantly higher demand
than the unlabelled product, be deemed to create a difference in grade
or quality.
Finally, the majority asserted that by preserving a physical test
under the "like grade and quality" phrase and by evaluating marketing
differences under the tendency-to-lessen-competition and cost-justification provisions, the Commission would be able to attack "exorbitant
discriminations favoring private brand customers over the seller's
regular distributors."' 8 The majority seems to have been asserting that
so long as a physical test for like grade and quality was retained, the
Commission would possess the power to decide whether the price spread
between labelled and unlabelled products was too great (under the
tendency-to-lessen-competition or cost-justification clauses); whereas
if a heavily advertised brand were taken as creating a difference in
grade or quality, the Commission would lack such power. The majority
was correct in this aspect of its rationale. The Act's structure requires
that in order for the Commission to exercise a supervisory power over
the extent or scope of a discrimination the sales compared must be
of goods deemed to be of "like grade and quality." The extent to
which a price spread between advertised and unadvertised products
would be lawful and the criteria appropriate for assessing the lawfulness of the spread, however, are problematical.
The Borden litigation. The differing positions within the Committee were echoed in the Borden litigation of the 1960's. 19 In that
litigation the Commission rejected the respondent Borden Company's
assertion that evaporated milk sold under the Borden label and that
sold under private label were of different grades or qualities and
ordered Borden to cease selling private-label evaporated milk at prices
below those at which it sold its Borden-label milk.20 The Fifth Circuit
adopted a position similar to the minority of the Attorney General's
Committee and reversed. 2 ' The court indicated that different labels
might lack economic significance, in which case the court would refuse to attach legal consequences to them. But asserting that when
18. Id. at 159.
19. Borden Co., 62 F.T.C. 130 (1963), rev'd, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964),
re'd,383 U.S. 637 (1966), on remand, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967).
20. 62 F.T.C. at 182, 193; id. at 181. The Commission expressed willingness, however, to permit differentials among brands which could be cost justified. Id. at 181.
21. Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1964).
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"labels are proven to have demonstrable commercial significance ...
they can change the grade of a product," 22 the court held that the
Borden label was commercially significant. The court therefore concluded that the private-label and the Borden-label milk were of different grades or qualities and that no violation of section 2 (a) had
occurred.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and remanded the
case to that court 3 While the Court's opinion was reminiscent of the
majority position of the Attorney General's Committee, 24 the Court
added a note of sophistication to the dialogue. In effect, the Court
challenged the argument that a price differential necessarily creates a
different "grade" of good. The Court reasoned that if such were the
case, a price differential would be self-justifying and any amount sold
under one brand would differentiate that brand in "grade" from sales
of the same good under other brands. Under such an approach, any
seller would be able to discriminate at will merely by attaching different labels to goods sold at each price level.
On remand, the Fifth Circuit again set aside the Commission's
order, this time on the ground that no tendency to lessen competition
existed 2 5 The court reached this result with respect to secondary-line
competition by finding that no competitive advantage was conferred
on the buyer of the lower-priced, private-label milk. Its reasoning followed that of the majority of the Attorney General's Committee, and
it nicely skirted the earlier Supreme Court opinion. The Fifth Circuit
held that the price differential could not confer a competitive advantage when it did no more than reflect consumer preferences. 20
If the Fifth Circuit had held that a brand price difference necessarily
had no effect on competition, it would have been in conflict with the
Supreme Court, which had held that brand price differentials could
not be self-justifyingY The Fifth Circuit brought its decision into
harmony with the prior Supreme Court ruling by holding that brand
differentials may or may not tend to lessen competition depending on
whether they are too large. In dealing with brand-name price differentials the Fifth Circuit accepted the Supreme Court's position that
price differentials on differently-branded goods could not be self-justi22. 339 F.2d at 137-38.
23. FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966).

24.

REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE

ANTTRUST LAWs 158-59 (1955).

25. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967).
26. 381 F.2d at 181.
27. 383 U.S. at 644-45.
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lying. However, it held that the justification depended upon the extent
of the differential. In so deciding, the court accepted the propriety of
a brand price differential so long as the price differential reflected the
difference in worth between the two products. The differential in worth
was seen by the Fifth Circuit as a differential in "consumer appeal." 28
Measuring differences in "worth." It now becomes necessary to
address the problem of how the differences in worth between two
brands or between labelled and unlabelled products can be measured.
Does the very fact that the "public" will pay more for a labelled
product than for an unlabelled product mean that a price spread
between the two products measures the difference in their worth and,
therefore, that no advantage accrues to the buyer of the lower-priced
product? If so, then the court in Borden may be correct in finding that
no "injury" to secondary-line competition is likely to result from the
price difference. If this approach is taken then, it is legitimate to ask
when, if ever, a price difference between a private brand and an advertised brand can be unlawful. The response would be: When the
price difference exceeds the difference in worth of the two products.
But if the very fact that the public is paying two prices is conclusive
evidence of their difference in worth, then this analysis is circular.
The Supreme Court condemned reasoning of this type in applying
the "like grade and quality" provision to goods sold under different
29
labels at different prices.
If any credence is to be given to the assertion that a price differential between a labelled and an unlabelled product is lawful when
it equals, but not when it exceeds, the difference in worth between
the two products, some method of measuring their relative worths
must be found. If a seller sold a major portion of his unlabelled goods
at one price, but sold some of his unlabelled goods at a lower price to a
few large customers, then it might be possible to view the price at
which the major portion of the unlabelled goods were sold as establishing their worth. The sales of the unlabelled goods to the few favored
customers would confer on them an advantage over those buyers who
bought the unlabelled goods at a higher price. The favored customers
would gain a similar advantage over buyers who purchased a labelled
28. 381 F.2d at 181.
29. 383 U.S. at 644-45. The problem of measuring the "worth" of a brand is
obviously complicated by the fact that at different differentials over similar unbranded
products different amounts of the branded product will be sold. For some buyers,
the brand may be worth more than for other buyers. Compare the Supreme Court's
unsuccessful attempt to articulate an analogous concept in Fortner Enterprises, Inc.
v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04 (1969).
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version of the product from that seller at a price higher than any
price at which he sold unlabelled items. In this situation, it could
be said that the difference in price between the labelled goods and
those unlabelled goods sold to the large favored customers exceeded
the difference in "worth" between the labelled and unlabelled products.
However, since the seller would be discriminating in the sale of his
unlabelled product, an offense often might be established in these
circumstances without even considering the sales of the labelled product.
Hence a measurement of the difference in worth between the labelled
and unlabelled products might here be superfluous.30
When a seller sells his unlabelled product at a standard price to
all customers, he cannot be accused of discriminating in the sale of
his unlabelled products. However, according to the Fifth Circuit and
the majority of the Attorney General's Committee, this seller could be
accused of discriminating between buyers of his labelled product and
buyers of his unlabelled product if the difference between the prices
which he charges for the two products exceeds the difference in their
worths. If buyers do not distinguish the unlabelled product from
similar products offered by other firms, then there may be a basis for
calculating a market price by which to measure the worth of the unlabelled product. Were a seller to sell his unlabelled product below
that price, then there would be a basis for finding that the price differential between the labelled and unlabelled products exceeded the
difference in worth between the two products.
Such an analysis may have been the basis for the Commission's
objection to Borden's private-label selling. The Commission may have
felt that Borden's private-label prices were below the normal "market"
level for unlabelled milk and, hence, that the differential between the
Borden-label product and the private-label product exceeded the difference in worth (which would be measured by the difference between
the Borden-label milk and the general market price for unlabelled
milk). This approach would require the Commission to attack privatelabel prices which were allegedly below market level even though
the seller sold all of his unlabelled goods at a single price. By focusing
its attack on the secondary-line effects of such pricing, the Commission
probably hoped to avail itself of the presumption established by the
Supreme Court in FTC v. Morton Salt Co.31 that competitive injury
30. Measurement of the worth of the brand might be necessary, however, to
establish injury to buyers of the branded product who competed with the favored
large buyers of the unbranded product.
31. FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948). In Morton Salt the Supreme
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arises merely from the fact that sales of a product were made to competing customers at substantially different prices. This would enable
the Commission to avoid any inquiry into the actual effects of such
pricing.
The Borden Company, however, avoided the impact of this presumption and defeated the Commission's claim of secondary-line harm
by showing that it would sell unlabelled milk to any buyer who
wanted it. 32 The general availability of the Borden private-label milk

protected all dealers against unfair advantages accruing to their rivals
because of the latter's access to low-priced Borden private-label milk.
No milk dealer handling the Borden labelled milk need to have lost
sales because a rival was selling the private-label milk, even at a price
below its "worth," since he also had access to the unlabelled milk at the
same low price.
This disposition of the secondary-line harm issue is instructive.
Secondary-line harm is most likely to occur either when sales of the
private-label product are not made at the same prices to everyone, or
when sales of the unlabelled or private-label product are made to only
one or to a few favored customers, as in the early Goodyear case. 33
Analyses of price differentials between labelled and unlabelled products generally focus upon justifications for the price premiums demanded for labelled products. 34 However, such analyses are misleading because the harm, if any, is caused by the low price of the unlabelled
product. Following the Fifth Circuit's direction, 3 the inquiry, for
secondary-line purposes, should determine whether the low price asked
for the unlabelled goods was available to all dealers buying the unCourt sanctioned the raising of a presumption of secondary-line injury as a result of
a producer's sales of the same item to competing dealers at substantially different prices.
Prices are substantially different when the difference is sufficient in amount to influence the dealers' resale prices. Id. at 47, 50. Implications of the Morton Salt case
are discussed in Gifford, The Concept of "Competitive Advantage" in Assessing
Secondary-Line Injury Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 44 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 48
(1975).
32. The Commission conceded that there was no evidence that Borden refused
to sell private-label milk to any customer who requested it. 383 U.S. at 661 n.20
(Stewart, J., dissenting); 381 F.2d at 178, 180; cf. William Inglis & Sons Baking Co.
v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 389 F. Supp. 1334, 1341 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
33. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232 (1936).
34. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS "158-59 (1955); see Justice Stewart's dissent in FTC v. Borden Co.,
383 U.S. 637, 647, 649-52 (1966). See also Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 133, 137-38
(1964), rev'd, 383 U.S. 637 (1966); Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 180-81 (5th
Cir. 1967).
35. 381 F.2d at 180 n.14; cf. Boss Mfg. Co. v. Payne Glove Co., 71 F.2d 768,
770-71 (8th Cir. 1934). See also F. Rows, PRIcE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

97-98 (1962).
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labelled goods. If the unlabelled goods were available, then analysis
of the relative "worths" of the branded and unbranded products ought
to be irrelevant. If they were not available, then inquiry into relative
worth again seems basically unproductive. If the seller's unlabelled
goods are being sold at a prevailing price and if similar goods can be
obtained elsewhere for the same price, then no dealer is disadvantaged
because his rivals have access to lower-priced goods.a6 If, however, the
seller is selling his unlabelled goods below the generally prevailing
price at which physically identical goods can be obtained from other
suppliers, then his sales of these lower-priced goods confer advantages
upon those buying his goods. Furthermore, these advantages cannot
be duplicated by rival dealers to whom he does not sell the unlabelled
product. If he also sells a labelled product to those rival dealers at his
standard price for his labelled product, then he should be subjected to
the Morton Salt presumption.37 The competitive injury incurred by
the disfavored dealers, however, is not properly measured by the
"worth" of the label attached to the products sold to them. Rather, it is
measured by the difference between the low price at which the seller
offers the unlabelled product and the generally prevailing price for
that product.
Primary-line aspects. Harm on the primary line-which was the
Commission's predominant concern 3 8-could exist only when Borden's
private-label sales were lower in price than the private-label sales of
Borden's competitors. The Fifth Circuit viewed the evidence as showing that Borden's rivals were injured because Borden sold its privatelabel milk cheaper than they did. 31 But the evidence did not show that
the harm to the rivals occurred because Borden maintained a price
difference between the two kinds of milk. Thus, the Fifth Circuit
found the requisite causal connection between the discrimination and
the competitive harm to be missing.40
It is apparent that Borden's conduct can be described in causal
terms which link its discrimination to potential seller-line injury if its
higher-priced sales of its premium brand milk is accepted as a given.
For example, if private-label milk of its rivals is selling for $2.00 per
case, potential injury to seller-line competition could occur, in the
36. See Tri-Valley Packing Ass'n v. FTC, 329 F.2d 694, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1964);
F. RowE, supra note 35, at 186, 193-95.
37. See not 31 supra.
38. See In re Borden Co., 62 F.T.C. 130, 170-75 (1963).
39. Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 178, 180 (5th Cir. 1967).
40. 381 F.2d at 180.
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court's view, if and when Borden undercuts its rivals by selling
private-label milk at $1.50 per case. But the act by which Borden sells
private-label milk for $1.50 is the same act by which Borden sells
private-label milk for $1.00 less than it charges for its Borden-label
milk, and it is the $1.50 sales which the court admitted caused injury
to Borden's rivals. So viewed, the lower-priced sales constituted the act
of discrimination which "caused" the harm to Borden's rivals.
The Court, however, demanded more than this type of causation.
It apparently required that a causal connection be shown between the
level of the higher price to Borden-brand customers and the level of the
lower price to the private-brand customers. The court was almost
asking-in the classic attitude of anti-price-discrimination crusaders 1
--whether the higher brand price in some way "subsidized" the lower
price to private-label customers. This question is not always easily
answered. If revenues generated by sales of the labelled product covered
all of the fixed charges associated with production, it is possible that a
producer would find it profitable to sell his private-brand product for
a price below his average production cost. This course of action would
maximize the seller's profits if the below-average-cost selling price of
the unlabelled product was the highest price at which he could dispose of his excess production. 4 The receipts from the below-average41. A "subsidy" analysis of discriminatory pricing has long found favor among
supporters of the price-discrimination law. At the time of the enactment of the original
section 2 of the Clayton Act (later amended by the Robinson-Patman Act), multimarket sellers were perceived as subsidizing below-cost operations in competitive markets
from monopoly prices in other markets. S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1914);
H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1914). When the Robinson-Patman Act
was enacted, chain stores and other large buyers were perceived as coercing their
suppliers-who were suffering from excess capacity and the pressure of large fixed costs
-into offering their goods at marginal-cost prices and then recouping their unit-cost
deficits from sales at higher prices to smaller customers. See S. REP. No. 1502, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936); H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1936). See
also, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 6621, 6622, 7324 (1936). See also International Air Indus.,
Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 725 n.32 (5th Cir. 1975); Borden Co.
v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1967) ; In re Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 808-09
(1965) (Elman, J., dissenting), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir.
1968).

42.

See M.

ADELMAN,

A&P: A

STUDY IN PRICE-COST BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC

POLICY 142-49 (1959). Adelman makes the point that a seller of a brand-name product
who has covered his fixed costs on sales of that product and who still experiences
excess capacity will find it profitable to employ his excess capacity in the production
of goods which can be sold for any price above the incremental cost of producing them,
i.e., their sales price need not cover an equally allocated share of total (fixed and
variable) costs. This is a slight oversimplification which is strictly true only if sales in
the higher-priced market are taken as given or if marginal costs are constant. Total
profits would be maximized iu a strict sense if price and volume were set in both the
higher- and lower-priced markets interdependently. See J. ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS
O1' IMPERFECT COPETITION 179-202 (1933). Recently the Fifth Circuit has come close
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cost sales would add to his profits so long as they exceeded the marginal
cost of producing the unlabelled product because the fixed charges
would have been fully recovered in the sales receipts from the labelled
product. In this situation, the receipts from the sales of the labelled
item would be necessary to enable the seller to continue, over the long
run, to sell the unlabelled item at the below-average-cost price. The
receipts from the sales of the branded items thereby "subsidized" the
lower-priced operations. The causal connection between the discrimination and the competitive harm, required by the Fifth Circuit
in its second Borden opinion, would thus be established. 48 This illustration is but one application of a general method of discriminatory pricing which is consonant with short-run profit maximization: setting the
price in each market at the point consistent with equalizing marginal
cost for total production with marginal revenue for each market.44
Much legal and economic literature, 4 as well as much conventional wisdom, assumes that pricing for short-run profit maximization
is the pricing norm in a competitive economic system. It is thus highly
interesting that the subsidy approach to Robinson-Patman causation
would tend to support a determination of illegality in a circumstance
in which prices had been set under a short-run profit-maximization
criterion. Moreover, when the price level in the lower-priced market
is higher than average cost, a decrease in price in the higher-priced
market which did not affect the volume of sales in that market-perhaps an unrealistic assumption'"-would not cause a seller who sought
to recognizing that pricing at or above marginal cost may be profit maximizing. See

International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724 n.25 (5th
Cir. 1975).

43. More recently, the Fifth Circuit seems largely to have precluded itself from
finding a subsidy when a seller's prices equal or exceed marginal cost. International
Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724-25 (5th Cir. 1975).
44.

J. ROBINSON,

supra note 42, at 182.

45. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section
2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HeRv. L. Riv. 697, 703 (1975). These authors, while assuming short-run profit maximization as a norm, appropriately point out various circumstances in which deviations from the norm may be proper.
46. A decrease in price would, of course, be expected to increase the amount of
the product which would be demanded in the marketplace so long as demand was not
perfectly inelastic. But if marginal cost were rising, sales in the higher-priced market
could not be increased without decreasing sales in the lower-priced market. Since a price
reduction from the optimal level in the higher-priced market would decrease the net
marginal return from sales in that market to a level below the net marginal return from
sales in the lower-priced market, there is some reason to believe that a seller who
(for whatever reason) was selling at a sub-optimal price in one market would not
fulfill the demand for that product in that market at the sub-optimal price. To do so
would replace sales producing a greater net marginal return with sales producing a
smaller net marginal return.
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to maximize his short-run profits to increase his price in -the lowerpriced market. 47 Nor would any increase in price in the lower-priced
market result from a decrease in price in the higher-priced market
which did affect the volume of sales in that market in a circumstance
of constant marginal costs.48 These considerations seem to weaken the
"causal" connection between the high prices and the low prices which
divert sales from rivals. Under Mrs. Robinson's classic approach to
price discrimination, 49 the price level in each market is basically independent of the price level in the other market. The price level in each
market is chosen to maximize operating profits in that market. The
price levels in the two markets are related only through their effect on
volume sold which, in turn, affects the total level of production. Once
volume is determined, however, reduction of the price in the higherpriced market would not exert an upward pressure on price in the
lower-priced market. It is only when the price in the lower-priced
market is below average cost that it begins to be realistic to speak of a
subsidy. The subsidy does not affect the level of prices in the lowerpriced market since so long as the firm sells in that market, the firm's
price in that market would in any event be set at its existing level in
order to maximize net operating revenue. Rather, the "subsidy"
is one which keeps the firm in an aggregate profit position despite its
below-cost sales in one market.
Since the "below-cost" sales add to the firm's profits, "subsidy" is
not the best descriptive term. The "subsidy" does not seem to affect
the price level in the lower-priced market nor does it compensate
the firm for unprofitable operations. 50 It merely permits the firm to
continue in business and, over the long run, to make some sales which
do not earn sufficient revenue to cover their pro rata share of fixed
production costs. This situation exemplifies the type of marginal-cost
pricing which is feasible for a firm selling in two or more markets and
47. Price in any market is a function of marginal revenue in that market and
marginal cost. So long as the two markets are independent, marginal revenue in the
lower-priced market will not be affected by occurrences in the higher-priced market.
And when total volume is unchanged, marginal cost will be unchanged. Therefore, in a
situation of constant costs, prices and sales in the lower-priced market Will not be
affected by a sales increase in the higher-priced market.
48. Sales volume in the lower-priced market would be determined by the offering price in that market which, in turn, would be set at the level which brought marginal
revenue in that market and marginal cost into equality. When marginal cost is constant,
a sales increase in the higher-priced market will not affect the level of marginal cost.
49. See J. RoBINSON, supra note 42.
50. Since sales in the lower-priced market add to the firm's overall profits (or decrease its deficit) so long as the revenues produced by those sales exceed the incremental
costs incurred in making them, it is misleading to suggest that these sales are unprofitable.
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which sometimes may give it an advantage over a rival whose sales
are confined to a single market. In the long run both firms must cover
their average costs. However, the former need cover, in any one market,
only its marginal costs of operation while the latter must cover its
total average cost in its only market of operations.51
At this point it is necessary to understand how the price level at
which the unlabelled product is sold compares with the price at which
rival goods are sold. If the firm's unlabelled product is being sold at
the same rate as similar unlabelled products, then the higher price for
the labelled product would have no impact on the price level at which
the unlabelled goods were sold. They are sold at the going pricewhich is the only practicable price at which they can be sold. The
availability of substitutes at that price would make it impossible to sell
unlabelled products at a higher price, and so long as the going price
can be obtained for the firm's entire production, it would be economically unwise to sell for less.
If, however, a seller cannot dispose if its excess production at the
going prices of its rivals, it will seek to cut price to dispose of its product.
Indeed, an examination of the "demand" for its unlabelled product
may show a downward-sloping demand rather than a horizontal, perfectly elastic demand at the going price. If so, then this seller may find
that profit maximization may occur at a point below the so-called
going price. Such a firm may begin by offering concessions to selected
customers. 52 If it can dispose of its excess production through a combination of "going price" sales and discount sales, its total revenues
are likely to be larger than they would be through a general price cut.
On the other hand, if the price concessions are many and large and if
the selling expenses incurred in obtaining discount sales are large,
such a firm may eventually find that it can maximize its profits by
openly reducing price across the board. This may be especially true
when the firm's rivals are inhibited from matching the firm's price
reduction.-' For example, Borden's prices from its southern plants may
51. See, e.g., Amalgamated Sugar Co., 54 F.T.C. 943, 945 (1958), where, in its
opinion accompanying a consent order, the Commission expressed its concern that singleplant sellers were particularly vulnerable to geographic price cutting by multi-plant rivals.
52. The firm may offer concessions initially only to selected customers whose purchases are significantly large, rather than reduce price across-the-board to all buyers
in order to retain pre-existing unit-profit margins on as large a sales base and for so
long a period as possible. Stigler has suggested that oligopolists may offer concessions
initially to large buyers as a means of reducing the chances that their rivals will learn
of the concessions and respond to them with similar concessions. Stigler, A Theory of
Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. EcoN. 44, 47 (1964).
53. A seller's demand elasticity would be expected to increase as rivals were in-
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have been lower than rivals' prices because its rivals were located
outside of the south and sold milk at a uniform delivered price throughout the nation. Borden, in pricing f.o.b. from its southern plants, would
thus have had a natural freight advantage over its rivals in selling to
southern customers. 54 Since Borden would predictably have won any
extended price contest in the southern region, its competitors may
have decided to eschew price rivalry and to continue with their existing policy of selling at a uniform delivered price throughout the nation. In this instance, Borden's freight advantage aided its prediction of
its rivals' behavior and increased the elasticity of the demand which
it perceived for its unbranded product.
In these circumstances, the subsidy analysis discussed above, becomes relevant. To the extent that the lower-priced, unlabelled product
is selling not only below market price but below average unit cost, a
causal connection may be established between the discrimination, qua
discrimination, and the low prices. In these circumstances the inquiry
must focus on the actual and potential impact on rivals and upon the
likely significance of this impact upon the maintenance of competition
in the market place 55 at a level of suitable intensity.
But in these primary-line injury cases-as in secondary-line injury
cases 5 -- the connection between the seller's labels (or lack of them)
with his discriminatory price structure generally will not be of primary
significance. So long as the unlabelled product is selling below unit
cost, the causal argument is likely to be the crucial one, and the causal
argument turns upon the extent to which profitable sales are "subsidizing" below-cost sales. So long as the labelled product's price exhibited from matching his price reductions. See Bishop, Elasticities, Cross-Elasticities,
and Market Relationships, 42 AM. ECON. REv. 779, 786-89 (1952). See also E.
CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 90-91 (8th ed. 1962); i.
TRinFIN, MONOPOLISTIC COIIETITION AND GENERAL EQuiLiBR1um

THEORY 100

(1940);

cf. Markovits, Oligopolistic Pricing Suits, the Sherman Act, and Economic Welfare, 26
STAN. L. REv. 493, 498 (1974), whose approach to oligopoly is largely based upon the
relationships between demand elasticity and cross-elasticity.
54. 381 F.2d at 178-79.
55.

That is, after the causal connection between discrimination and market effects

is determined, it is necessary to evaluate those effects for their long-run consequences.
In the Dean Milk Co. case, for example, the Commission stated, in effect, that primaryline injury would be found if the market effects of the discrimination would be likely
significantly to increase concentration in the market. In re Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710,
750 (1965), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 395 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968). See also
Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 709, 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968); cf. Yale & Towne
Mfg. Co., 52 F.T.C. 1580, 1598 (1956). Some attention to this matter is given in my

work, Evolution of Standards for Assessing Primary-Line Injury Under the RobinsonPatman Act, March 6, 1976 (unpublished manuscript).
56. See text accompanying notes 29-37 supra.
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ceeds unit cost, it can be seen as subsidizing below-unit-cost sales of
57
the unlabelled product.

The advertising expense approach to value. The Attorney General's Committee also recommended a second approach to the matter

of brand-name price differentials. Under this approach a lower price
for an unlabelled product than for a labelled product would be costjustified by savings in advertising expenses

8

By this method, a price

differential between labelled and unlabelled goods would be justified
when the differential did not exceed the advertising costs incurred in

marketing the labelled goods. This approach, however, appears inconsistent with the incentive to advertise. A firm advertises so long as
the additional revenue which it expects to receive from the selling of

an advertised product exceeds the extra costs it incurs from the advertising. The extra revenue spent by the firm must raise per-unit revenue

by more than the firm's advertising expenditure allocated over its sales
of the advertised goods. Otherwise, the advertising expenses will reduce,
rather than increase, the firm's profits.59
57. In the situation described, the Commission or a court would be able to
impute a causal connection between the discrimination and the market effects. The
imputation of that causal connection would not be compelled, however. Robinson-Patman
causality is discussed in my forthcoming article, Promotional Price Discrimination and
the Robinson-Patman Act.
A caveat to the statement in the text might be entered here. The traditional approach to Robinson-Patman subsidy analysis would see below-cost sales (or even sales
earning below normal profits) as subsidized by sales earning supracompetitive profits.
Former Commissioner Elman, for example, taking this approach would find no subsidy
when supracompetitive profits were not earned in sales of the higher-priced goods. See
Dean Milk Co., 68 F.T.C. 710, 799-800 (1965), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 395
F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1968). Under this approach the "worth" of the product label
could be thought relevant to determining whether the labelled product was earning
greater than normal profits. "Normal" profits for the labelled product would be
measured by the aggregate of (i) normal profits for an unlabelled product plus (ii)
the "worth" of the label. If the labelled product was selling for a price which exceeded
unit cost plus normal profits computed in this way, then it would be producing supranormal profits and could be seen as subsidizing the below-cost sales of the unlabelled
product. But the very articulation of this kind of analysis exposes its artificiality. The
relevant factors to subsidy of below-cost sales are profits from other sales-whether those
profits be characterized as above or below normal. In this light the worth of the label
has no significance. Moreover, the label is always worth the differential at which
labelled goods can be sold above the price of unlabelled goods and higher-priced sales
by the fact of their occurrence prove that worth. But although the "worth" inquiry is
thus circular, it is irrelevant. A court which is unwilling to find a subsidizing effect in
circumstances in which higher-priced sales produce profits and lower-priced sales at belowcost levels add to profits is employing the flexibility inherent in attributing causal connections to absolve such pricing on policy grounds. Cf. International Aid Indus., Inc. v.
American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 723-25 (5th Cir. 1975).
58. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CODIMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTRUST LAws 159 (1955).

59. See Gifford, The Concept of "Competitive Advantage" in Assessing SecondaryLine Injury Under the Robinon-Patman Act, 44 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 48 (1975);
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Brand-name differentiation in applying the "meeting competition"
defense. While the Commission has apparently ignored brand differences as an element of pice discrminiation under section 2 (a), it has
nonetheless recognized that an economic value attaches to advertised
brand-name products in applying the "meeting competition" defense
of section 2 (b) .6o The Commission has asserted that the meeting-competition defense is unavailable to a seller of a heavily advertised
product, which has generally commanded a premium price over lesser
advertised brands, when that seller has attempted to lower price sufficiently to meet the lower prices of non-premium brands. According
to the Commission, that defense is available to the seller of a premiumpriced product to justify such conduct only when his price reduction
does not impinge on the usual differential between premium and nonpremium products."'
The Commission has been criticized for recognizing the economic
value of an advertised brand under the section 2 (b) meeting-competition defense while refusing recognition to that value in its interpretation of the "like grade and quality" clause of section 2 (a) .O However,
the Commission has not necessarily been inconsistent. Its recognition
of the economic reality of a customer brand preference under section
2 (b) does not automatically require it to conclude that an advertised
product is of a different grade or quality from an unadvertised one.
The Commission can admit that two items are the "same" product and
of the same "grade and quality" without denying the economic reality of
a differentiation within a larger product grouping. In its AnheuserBusch, Inc. decision, 63 for example, the Commission condemned
Anheuser-Busch for discriminatorily reducing the price of its "Budweiser" premium beer in the St. Louis marketing area to the level
of non-premium beers sold by three regional breweries located in St.
Louis. Yet the Commission denied Anheuser-Busch the meeting-competition defense so long as its prices fell below a premium-product
cf. M. ADELMAN, A&P: A STUDY IN PRICE-COST BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC POLICY 146
(1959).
60. "[N]othing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case
thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or facilities to
any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor." 15 U.S.C. § 13(b)
(1970).
61. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 302 (1957); Standard Oil Co., 49
F.T.C. 923, 952 (1953).
62. E.g., Eine Kleine Juristische Schlummergeschichte, 79 HARV. L. REv. 921,
928 (1966).
63. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277 (1957), rev'd, 265 F.2d 677 (7th Cir.
1959), rev'd, 363 U.S. 536 (1960), order vacated, 289 F.2d 835 (7th Cir. 1961).
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differential. This decision was based on the assumption that nationallyadvertised "premium" beer is of sufficiently the "same" grade and
quality as regionally-sold non-premium beer as to be in the same competitive market with it. Thus, the harm the Commission found was to
competition in the St. Louis market for all beer, whether premium or
non-premium. In its section 2 (b) holdings, then, the Commission was
not asserting that the labelled and unlabelled products were different.
Rather, it was indicating that the meeting-competition defense is available to the seller of the advertised product only when he does not
impinge on the usual differential between advertised "premium" and
unadvertised non-"premium" products. These section 2 (b) rulings
thus are concerned with the variations in economic values within the
same product classifications-with what constitutes "an equally low
price" of a competitor-rather than with determining what constitutes
the same product.
In the Fifth Circuit's second Borden decision, 4 the court justified
the different prices which were charged for the labelled and unlabelled
milk on the ground that the difference in price measured the difference in economic value between the goods. The court reasoned that
if this were so, then there could be no adverse competitive effect.
While the verbalization is different, the result harmonizes with the
Commission's section 2 (b) position. Under both sections 2 (a) and
2 (b), the labelled and unlabelled goods would be accepted as the
same product and as of the same grade and quality. Under each section, the Commission's position can be defended as consisitent to the
extent that it asserts that prices between a labelled product and an
unlabelled product should differ by the economic value attached to
the brand. Where there is a real value-attested by prior trading at a
price differential-the Commission incorporated the economic reality
of this differential into its reading of the "equally low price" clause of
section 2 (b). Similarly, where there is a demonstrable economic
reality attaching to the label, the Fifth Circuit, applying section 2 (a),
would find a price difference not in excess of this value to be consistent with the maintenance of competitive market conditions. This
position harmonizes with the Commission's section 2 (b) position.
Where, however, the Commission finds a label to be economically
valueless, it could not deny its owner the right, under section 2(b),
to meet the actual prices of similar products sold by rivals, and it
would necessarily have to reject an asserted justification for discrimina64.

Borden Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 175, 181 (5th Cir. 1967).
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tion which was premised upon the presence or absence of that label.
But while the Commission's approaches under sections 2 (a) and
2 (b) are consistent, they are not equally valid in their entirety. As the
Commission has asserted, under section 2 (a), differences in the economic value of the labels ought not to be deemed to produce different
products. A search for the "worth" of the various labels, however, often
may not be a profitable endeavor for the enforcement agencies. Since
recourse to the 2 (b) defense should be unnecessary for a firm which
decides permanently to jettison a previously-established premiumproduct differentiation, the requirement that a firm maintain a
premium differential which it itself has established for purposes of
applying the section 2 (b) defense does not seem unduly objectionable.
Summary and Conclusion. Sellers offering labelled and unlabelled
versions of an otherwise similar product at different prices may sometimes find themselves charged with violations of the Robinson-Patman
Act. In some such cases, a determination of the "worth" of the label in
question may be relevant to the proof of an offense or to the establishment of the plaintiff's injury. Nevertheless, the extent of that
"worth" cannot be shown merely from the fact that the labelled and
unlabelled versions of the product sell for different amounts; otherwise, the discrimination involved in the sales at different prices would
always be self-justifying. Fortunately, in many secondary-line cases a
determination concerning the worth of a label may be unnecessary to
establish an offense. Moreover, a seller should always be able to protect himself against a charge of secondary-line injury by offering the
unlabelled product to all buyers. In addition, a seller ought generally
to be able to defend against charges of primary-line injury whenever
he sells the unlabelled version of the product for a price equal to or
above his average total cost of production and distribution.

